Rising Political Violence and the Security Readiness Gap in the U.S.

Author Credentials:

Over the past decade, since stepping out of military service, Travis Weathers has led and performed hundreds of covert facility breaches against Fortune 100 companies across sectors like healthcare, finance, retail, insurance, broadcast media, and banking, as well as critical infrastructure sites such as power distribution centers and educational institutions. These operations often carried objectives such as positioning to cause physical harm to on-air talent during prime-time news broadcasts or gaining access to physically and digitally sabotage critical infrastructure across some of America’s largest metropolitan areas. He has trained hundreds of professionals on these tactics, ranging from corporate security leaders to U.S. Special Operators. He has written security policies for organizations across multiple industries and has coached executives and their families on securing both their residences and their digital hygiene.

This real-world red team experience, essentially attacking organizations to test their defenses, has revealed a stark truth: complacency kills in security. Too often, the wrong people occupy critical protective roles, and organizations remain ill-prepared to detect or prevent determined attackers.

In this case study, we will investigate the rise of political violence and assassination attempts in the United States, expose why traditional security approaches are failing, and illustrate how proactive measures such as assessments, policy development, and training can save lives and assets.

Escalating Political Violence and Assassination Attempts

Political violence in America is surging to levels not seen in decades. High-profile attacks once thought to be relics of the 1960s and 1970s have re-emerged, creating an alarming trend of attempted and successful assassinations. Recent data shows a “dramatic rise” in attacks and plots motivated by partisan political views since 2016, with nearly three times as many incidents in the past five years as in the previous quarter-century. Experts say U.S. political violence is at its worst point since the turbulent 1970s. This spike includes violent threats, assassination attempts, and fatal attacks against public figures across the political spectrum.

Real-world incidents underscore the trend. In just the last year, multiple U.S. elected officials and public figures have been targeted. A sitting Minnesota state lawmaker was shot and killed in her own home, and another survived an attempted murder alongside his spouse. There were two assassination attempts on a U.S. President during the 2024 campaign. The threat is not confined to politicians: in late 2024, the CEO of UnitedHealth Group was brazenly shot and killed on a Manhattan sidewalk, a chilling reminder that corporate leaders can become targets as well. Most recently, Charlie Kirk, a prominent political commentator, was shot dead during a public speaking event, an act Utah’s governor bluntly labeled a “political assassination.” Each of these incidents took place on U.S. soil, shattering any illusion that modern America is immune to the kind of targeted violence that shakes governments and societies.

At the heart of this crisis is the preservation of human life and freedom of speech. These are not abstract values but foundational principles for the United States. When public servants, business leaders, or commentators risk their lives for speaking or encouraging open debate, the very essence of democratic society is under attack. As President Ronald Reagan once said, “Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on to them to do the same.” That fight today includes defending human life and ensuring that freedom of speech remains a right exercised without fear of political assassination.

Armed attacks can strike even seemingly secure public spaces, as political extremism and grievance-fueled violence lead individuals to target public officials, business leaders, and other figures. Recent years have seen a worrisome increase in plots and attacks, calling into question the effectiveness of current protective measures.

The motives behind these attacks vary – some are clearly partisan or ideological, while others are personal vendettas – but the common thread is that individuals are acting on violent intent toward specific people. A criminology expert notes that today’s perpetrators increasingly target individuals they associate with an opposing faction, rather than just attacking government buildings or symbols as in past extremist eras. This means the threat landscape is highly personalized and unpredictable: a lone gunman with a twisted grievance can be just as dangerous as an organized terrorist. And fueling this volatility is the toxic brew of hyper-polarized rhetoric and online radicalization. The ease of finding echo chambers on social media, where extreme views are reinforced, has lowered the barrier for angry individuals to move from hateful words to violent deeds. It’s no surprise, then, that U.S. authorities are inundated with threats against legislators, judges, and officials – a volume of threat intel that is difficult to triage.

Despite the relative rarity of successful assassinations in raw numbers, the impact is profound. Each incident sends shockwaves through the public and prompts the question: How did no one see this coming or stop it in time? The unsettling reality is that even well-funded agencies and protective details are struggling to adapt. Next, we examine how security forces – from federal agents to corporate security teams – are often caught flat-footed, and why misplaced confidence and complacency within the security apparatus are putting lives at risk.

Complacency and Failures in Protective Security

High-profile protectees – whether political leaders or C-suite executives – often surround themselves with trained security personnel and law enforcement escorts. On paper, these Protective Security Details (PSDs) and agency teams are elite; in practice, recent incidents reveal dangerous gaps in prevention and early threat detection. A sobering example came from an assassination attempt on a former President in July 2024: A Senate review found “wide-ranging failings” in the U.S. Secret Service’s preparation, including a known rooftop sniper hazard that was left unsecured at the rally venue. The would-be assassin took advantage of this oversight, firing eight rounds from a perch that agents themselves had identified beforehand as a risk. In the aftermath, the Secret Service’s acting director admitted the agency showed “complacency” among some agents and lacked clear communication and guidance with local police. In his words, “we must…make sure that we do not have another failure like this again”. Thankfully, that day the protectee survived with a minor injury, but the incident could have ended in tragedy – a direct consequence of seasoned security professionals letting their guard down.

It is often said in security circles that “complacency kills.” This mantra is not hyperbole – it reflects the harsh reality that the moment guards, agents, or executives assume “it won’t happen here,” they invite disaster. An executive protection specialist put it plainly: always being on guard is rule number one, because complacency kills. Yet complacency can take many forms. Sometimes it’s physical lapses – like failing to secure a door or neglecting to post overwatch on a known blind spot. Other times it’s a mental complacency – dismissing a suspicious remark or social media post as idle talk, or assuming that an arrest last month means a threat is “handled.” We’ve seen law enforcement units and corporate security teams alike fall victim to a “routine” mindset, where cursory badge checks or cursory event sweeps replace true vigilance.

Consider that most attackers exploit exactly those assumptions. The unpredictable shooter who targeted a CEO on a public street counted on the element of surprise – and indeed no one expected a corporate chief to be attacked in broad daylight. Likewise, the assassin who struck a speaker on a university campus took advantage of an environment where campus security was present but likely not anticipating a sudden gunshot from the crowd. These scenarios highlight a painful truth: even highly trained officers and agents can miss warning signs or fail to imagine tactics outside their usual playbook. When protective teams rely solely on “standard” procedures, a clever adversary will find the seams.

Unfortunately, a post-incident blame game often follows such failures. Rather than address systemic issues, organizations search for a scapegoat. We’ve seen individual guards, junior staff, or vendors swiftly fired or blamed after breaches – a knee-jerk reaction that solves nothing. Industry analysts warn that this blame culture masks deeper problems: “When CEOs scapegoat interns and admins, they really announce issues with policy, process, and accountability.” In other words, pointing fingers at a single employee (or a single “faulty” camera, etc.) is usually an admission that leadership failed to institute proper policies and oversight. Complacency often starts at the top. If the C-suite and security directors treat physical security as a low priority checkbox, that attitude trickles down to front-line personnel. Without a culture of vigilance, even a highly skilled bodyguard force or police detail can be rendered ineffective.

Wrong people in the wrong roles is another silent contributor to protective failures. In my experience performing covert breach tests, I’ve encountered security managers who had impressive résumés but outdated skills, and others placed in charge of physical security simply because they were senior in a different field (like IT or facilities) – not because they had true expertise in threat detection or adversary tactics. The executive protection field itself acknowledges a skills gap: not every practitioner has the needed training, and a “gap in baseline knowledge surfaces far too often in a profession where lives depend on performance.” The Dunning–Kruger effect is alive and well in security – individuals or firms often overestimate their capabilities and sell themselves as experts when they are not. Social media is flooded with self-styled “protection specialists” showing off gear and tactics that may look cool but diverge sharply from industry best practices. This has real consequences: clients (be they a politician’s staff or a corporate HR team) might hire unqualified “experts”, not realizing the person lacks the soft skills, planning acumen, or experience to prevent an attack. As one security expert noted, in this line of work “your decisions can determine the safety of others…blind overconfidence…is potentially lethal.” Put plainly, if a security team doesn’t know what it doesn’t know, the protectee pays the price.

So we have a situation where political and corporate targets face higher threat levels than ever, yet the very people responsible for guarding them may be lulled by routine, hampered by outdated training, or miscast in roles beyond their competence. The next section will look beyond the protective detail and examine the broader organizational weaknesses that attackers routinely exploit – often with little resistance – in both public institutions and private enterprises.

Security Gaps in Organizations and Institutions

High-profile assassinations grab headlines, but the underlying security weaknesses that enable them are alarmingly common across organizations of all kinds. Whether it’s a government building, a corporate headquarters, or a school campus, many institutions share the same flaws: depreciated security systems, under-trained staff, and a false sense of security about their risk exposure.

Start with the physical security hardware and procedures. Despite spending billions on security technology in the past two decades, basic access control failures plague many facilities. In a recent survey of security professionals, 66% of organizations reported a physical security breach in the past two years. How are intruders getting in? Often by walking right through the door. 48% of organizations experienced unauthorized entry due to “tailgating,” where an attacker simply follows an employee through a secure door. And 54% found doors propped open or left unlocked by staff, effectively inviting intruders inside. These numbers indicate a pervasive complacency about entry points – either through negligence or a misguided attempt to make life “more convenient” for employees. Such lapses can be catastrophic. (For instance, IBM’s 2024 data breach study found nearly 1 in 10 data breaches stemmed from physical security compromises, meaning an intruder bypassing the door can lead directly to network and data loss.)

Common vulnerabilities go well beyond doors. Attackers often exploit the “human factor” to bypass what gadgets are in place. Social engineering tactics – impersonating a delivery person, a contractor, or even a new hire – frequently trick untrained personnel. Poor enforcement of ID badge rules, inadequate visitor screening, lack of multi-factor authentication on secure doors, insufficient camera or alarm coverage, and untrained personnel easily fooled by ruses are all listed among the top security gaps in facilities. In other words, you can have the best cameras and locks, but if policies are lax and people aren’t trained to follow them, determined intruders will find a way. My team’s penetration tests have repeatedly confirmed this. We’ve breached Fortune 100 offices by exploiting exactly these weaknesses – a friendly smile and a fluorescent vest can get one past a lobby guard who isn’t expecting deceit. Organizations often don’t know what their own security systems are truly capable of, or not, and how attackers might bypass them.

Surveillance Posture: From Passive Recording to Proactive Control

Organizations routinely assume that installing cameras equals having surveillance—but in practice, many high-risk venues and events operate with a reactive posture: cameras record, footage is reviewed after the fact, but crucial problems during the event are unseen or unmitigated. This posture fails to account for how attackers exploit line-of-sight vulnerabilities, elevated vantage points, and time gaps of detection—particularly in large public gatherings or high-profile events.

What Went Wrong: The Butler Rally Case

The DHS Independent Review Panel’s July 13, 2024 Butler, Pennsylvania rally case is a textbook example:

• AGR Building rooftop vulnerability: The AGR building, whose rooftop gave line-of-sight toward the stage, was not secured by the Secret Service or state/local law enforcement, even though it was within ~150 yards of the stage. The attacker climbed onto the roof and fired eight rounds before counter-sniper action.
• Failure to mitigate line-of-sight: Although advance planning identified the AGR building as a threat, mitigations (barriers, camera coverage, or physical posts) were either insufficient or mismanaged. Visibility issues (e.g. tree obstructions) and ambiguous perimeter responsibilities left the roof inadequately monitored.
• Lack of continuous, live monitoring / oversight: Multiple observers saw suspicious activity (including someone with a rangefinder) near or on the AGR roof well before shots were fired, but the flow of information was delayed, communications were siloed, and no dedicated visual or physical post was maintaining live oversight of that rooftop.

Common Surveillance Failures (Across Institutions)

• Cameras are often placed only at entrances, lobbies, or internal choke points; elevated external vantage points (rooftops, adjacent buildings with sight-lines) are neglected.
• Live monitoring is weak or missing. Many organizations rely solely on recording for after-the-fact review, not on live video operators tasked with scanning for emerging threats.
• Operator staffing, playbooks, and hierarchy are often undefined or too weak to force escalation. A guard seeing someone on a rooftop may not have had clear authorities to respond or raise alarm.
• Pre-event risk assessment often misses hazard mapping of elevated external surfaces.
• Reliance on visual deterrents (e.g., cameras alone) without physical posts or security personnel to cover external vantage points when camera coverage is insufficient.

What Proactive Monitoring Requires

1. Hazard mapping & line-of-sight analysis - Identify all elevated vantage points (rooftops, adjacent buildings) and determine if they can see protectees or VIP movement paths. If so, mark them as critical areas.

2. Live coverage of hazard areas - Either via cameras with sufficient resolution, angle, and coverage or via trained physical posts. If neither is feasible, modify the venue layout or event plan.

3. Overhead / aerial surveillance layer - Temporary towers, drones (where lawful), elevated PTZs or roof-mounted cameras.

4. Clear command & integrated communications - Operators must have lines of communication to decision-makers, with defined escalation protocols for suspicious behavior or observations.

5. Training & auditable standards - Include scenario-based drills involving rooftop threats or aerial perches. Include after-action reviews and audits.

6. “No-coverage, no-go” policy - The venue or organization must enforce a policy that known hazard areas must be under visual control or physically secured. If not, reconfigure or cancel/relocate.

A major contributor to this problem is the tendency for organizations to blindly trust security product vendors and chase the latest high-tech solutions, while neglecting fundamentals. There’s nothing wrong with modern security tech – advanced cameras, analytics, etc. – but buying fancy equipment does not automatically make you secure. In fact, over-reliance on technology can breed a false sense of security. As one analysis noted, “buying more tools” can actually create a false sense of security while adding complexity. We see this in many corporate settings: leadership invests in an expensive camera system or AI threat detector and assumes threats will be caught, yet they fail to invest in training the staff who operate those systems or to update the procedures for responding to an alert. The result is often camera footage of an incident that no one acted on in time. Technology is only as effective as the people and processes behind it.

Nowhere is the gap between perceived security and actual security more evident than in our education system. Many school districts, under pressure from school violence incidents, have put money into security officers or cameras – but often just the minimum necessary to “check the box”. According to a school security consultant, “many district leaders invest the minimum necessary to maintain compliance or keep up appearances when it comes to school security.” This compliance-focused approach means schools do things like run occasional lockdown drills or have one officer patrolling, but they may ignore true vulnerabilities (e.g., multiple open campus access points, unvetted visitors, lack of threat assessment programs for troubled students). The unintended consequence is higher risk in the long run. We have seen the tragic results when school security is under-resourced or under-trained – doors that should lock don’t, no one has a key when needed, or officers hesitate because they never received proper active shooter training. The human toll of these failures is immense, and it feeds into a broader climate of fear. (It’s telling that teacher burnout is exacerbated by lack of safety; many educators cite fear for their security as a reason for leaving the profession.)

Businesses, too, often under-train their security staff or outsource to low-cost contractors, then assume everything is handled. But an inexperienced or undertrained guard force can be a liability. Security officers who lack proper training may respond inappropriately to incidents – either overreacting (and causing harm or panic) or freezing up and failing to act. If a breach occurs and a guard’s mistake contributes to the damage, the company can be held liable for negligent security practices. Beyond legal risk, there’s reputational damage: a bungled security incident makes the public and your employees lose confidence in their safety. Simply put, entrusting your physical security to unqualified personnel is a recipe for disaster – yet many organizations do exactly that, whether to save costs or because they don’t recognize the difference between a highly-trained protection professional and an ordinary rent-a-cop.

To summarize, here are some common security shortcomings prevalent in many organizations today:

• Outdated or poorly maintained security systems: Relying on old cameras, door locks, clonable access control cards, or alarms/sensors that cover only part of the facility, with no regular audits to identify blind spots or malfunctions.

• Lax enforcement of security policies: Employees prop doors open, skip visitor sign-ins, or let strangers “tailgate” into secure areas, without correction. Management often isn’t even aware it’s happening.

• Undertrained or misassigned personnel: Security guards or staff lack training in threat detection, de-escalation, and emergency response. In worst cases, individuals with limited security knowledge are put in charge, leading to dangerous overconfidence.

• Overconfidence in vendor solutions: Blindly trusting that a new security gadget or software will solve all problems. This can lead to complacency (“the system will catch it, we don’t have to”) and a false sense of security.

• Lack of threat awareness and early warning mechanisms: No robust channels to gather intelligence on potential threats (e.g. monitoring concerning social media posts, employee behavioral red flags, or FBI/DHS threat alerts). As a result, warning signs get missed until it’s too late.

Each of these gaps is exploitable by attackers – and, indeed, attackers from disgruntled insiders to organized criminals have exploited them time and again. The silver lining is that because these weaknesses are well-known, they are also addressable. Next, we focus on how organizations can flip the script: moving from complacency to proactivity, and from misguided security spending to strategic risk mitigation. The goal is to empower corporate leaders, security professionals, law enforcement partners, and everyday employees to detect and deter violence before it strikes, rather than scrambling in the aftermath.

Bridging the Gap: Proactive Security Measures That Work

If the status quo of “business-as-usual” security isn’t working, what will? In a climate of rising political violence and adaptive adversaries, organizations must become as serious and cunning about security as the attackers are about offense. This means embracing a proactive, intelligence-driven approach to physical security – one that involves expert assessments, robust policies, continuous training, and layered defenses. As a Service-Disabled Veteran-owned security firm, our team at Mayweather Group has focused on exactly these solutions, helping clients strengthen their security posture before a tragedy occurs.

First and foremost, organizations should assess their true security posture through realistic testing and analysis. It’s not enough to have an internal review or check-the-box audit; you need to think like an attacker. This is where red team operations and physical security assessments come in. By conducting controlled facility breach tests (with proper approvals), professional security testers can reveal how an intruder might circumvent your controls – whether by lock-picking, social engineering, or finding an unseen gap. The findings often jolt leadership into action. Seeing a report that “An unauthorized person gained access to the CEO’s floor by tailgating through three doors and wasn’t stopped by anyone” is far more impactful than theoretical advice. As one security white paper noted, 79% of organizations believe that improvements in physical security – better training, better technology, etc. – would have prevented their last security incident. Identifying those needed improvements requires a frank assessment. Our experience breaching critical sites has been eye-opening for many clients, revealing that what they thought was secure, wasn’t. The lesson is clear: don’t wait for a real attacker to show you where your weaknesses are – have ethical attackers find them first.

Based on assessment results, the next step is strengthening policies and procedures to close those gaps. A strong policy framework establishes what must be done (and not done) to maintain security day-to-day. For example, if tailgating is a problem, implement a strict badge policy: “No tailgating, no exceptions.” Make it a fireable offense for employees to let someone piggyback through a secure door. That may sound tough, but it sends the message that everyone is responsible for security. Education and awareness training should accompany such policies: staff and even executives need to be taught to politely challenge unfamiliar persons (“Hello, can I help you? Who are you here to see?”) rather than assume someone else vetted the stranger. Likewise, if a door is found propped open, there should be an immediate corrective process. Organizations should also develop threat assessment teams and protocols so that any hint of violence (a disgruntled comment, a social media threat, etc.) is documented and evaluated, not ignored.

Continuous training and drills are critical. You can’t hand employees a manual on active shooter response or emergency lockdown and consider it done. Regular drills for scenarios like an armed intruder, executive evacuation, or bomb threat will condition both security staff and employees to react swiftly under stress. This includes training protective details and law enforcement partners together with the organization’s staff when possible – coordination is key for fast response. We also advocate for specialized training for those in security leadership positions (corporate security directors, school safety officers, etc.) to keep them updated on the latest threat tactics. Just as attackers evolve, so must defenders. For example, an emerging threat is the use of drones for surveillance or even delivery of harmful payloads – do you have a policy or countermeasure for that? Only experts who stay current can advise on such evolving risks.

From a technology and infrastructure standpoint, layered defenses yield the best protection. No single gadget will stop a determined attacker, but multiple layers can delay and deter them until they are detected. For instance, a perimeter fence or access gate is a first layer; secure doors with badge readers form a second layer; internal locks or man-traps a third; and so on. Even if an adversary gets past the fence (layer 1), a locked door with an alarm can stop them at layer 2, or at least alert security to respond. Importantly, each layer should be integrated with a response plan – an alarm is only useful if someone acts on it immediately. Redundancy is also vital: if one officer or camera misses something, another can catch it. We’ve found that organizations that invest in this “defense in depth” approach – while also promoting a culture of vigilance – significantly harden themselves against intrusion.

Surveillance Posture & Live Monitoring Enhancements

Recent U.S. events make painfully clear that installing cameras is not enough. At the July 13, 2024 Butler, Pennsylvania, rally, a gunman fired from a rooftop (the AGR building) that was explicitly outside the declared security perimeter. That rooftop had no continuous visual monitoring or physical security post, despite its line-of-sight to the stage and prior warnings from law enforcement. Local officers later spotted the shooter on the rooftop just before the shots were fired — but there was no ready mechanism to escalate into active response.

To combat these kinds of failures, organizations must embed live video monitoring (human, AI-assisted, or hybrid) into their security operations. Live feeds are distinct from passive archiving: they allow detection of behavior in real time, escalation of threats, and intervention before violence starts. Industry data show that systems combining live monitoring with strong placement (e.g. covering rooftops, vantage points, perimeters) significantly outperform systems relying only on recording for after-the-fact review.

Finally, expert guidance is invaluable. In the same way companies hire cybersecurity firms to test their networks, engaging physical security experts (like our team at Mayweather Group) can provide an outside perspective that internal teams often lack. We support clients through end-to-end security programs: conducting thorough assessments, developing customized policies, and providing training workshops that resonate with employees and security staff alike. Our goal is to transfer knowledge and confidence, so that the boardroom, the guard booth, and the local police precinct are all on the same page about threats and responses. When an organization’s leadership understands security beyond buzzwords, they make smarter investment decisions – focusing on practical measures, not just vendor hype. They also stop treating security as an afterthought or a necessary cost center, and start treating it as a mission-critical function that can save lives and protect the business’s continuity.

To encapsulate the proactive approach, consider these key steps to improve physical security and prevent violence:

1. Conduct Regular Assessments: Evaluate your facilities through simulated attacks and professional audits. Identify how someone might penetrate your defenses and what the impact would be.

2. Enforce Strong Security Policies: Implement clear rules (visitor verification, badge use, emergency reporting protocols) and ensure executives down to interns know and follow them. Zero tolerance for complacency should be part of your culture.

3. Train Continuously at All Levels: Provide initial and ongoing training for security staff and regular employees. Drills for active shooter, evacuation, etc., should be conducted at intervals. Teach awareness – e.g., how spot surveillance or recognize social engineering attempts.

4. Invest Wisely in Layered Controls: Deploy multiple security measures that complement each other (perimeter barriers, electronic access control, surveillance, alarms, lighting, etc.). Ensure there are no single points of failure and that each layer is monitored. This includes covering roof-vantage points and external structures with live visuals or physical posts.

5. Validate and Update Plans: Don’t shelf your emergency response plan – practice it and update it based on lessons learned and new threats. Incorporate input from local law enforcement and security consultants. Ensure your crisis communication and incident response teams are prepared to act quickly.

By taking these steps, organizations send a message both internally and externally: we are not a soft target. Would-be attackers often conduct surveillance and planning before striking. If they encounter robust security measures, alert personnel who challenge them, and visible signs that the organization takes security seriously, they may be deterred or decide the effort isn’t worth it. And if they are foolish enough to attempt the attack regardless, a well-prepared security team and workforce will react swiftly to mitigate harm and save lives.

A security control room operator monitors live surveillance feeds. Modern security technology provides powerful tools, but without well-trained humans and proper procedures behind them, these tools can instill a false sense of safety. True security comes from a blend of smart technology, strict policy enforcement, and attentive personnel who remain vigilant – never allowing complacency to creep in.

Conclusion

The rise in political violence and targeted attacks in the U.S. is a wake-up call for corporate leaders, security professionals, law enforcement, and concerned citizens alike. We no longer have the luxury of viewing assassination attempts or workplace shootings as isolated aberrations – they are part of a pattern indicating serious deficiencies in our security readiness. Complacency, misinformation, and misallocated trust (in unvetted people or shiny products) have put the wrong people in charge and left critical vulnerabilities unaddressed. But this situation is not hopeless. By acknowledging the threats and learning from past failures, organizations can chart a new course – one grounded in proactive defense, rigorous training, and expert insight.

As someone who has spent a career on the offensive side of security (only to help make defenses stronger), I assure you that thinking like an attacker is the best way to stop one. The solutions are within reach: empower your security teams with knowledge and authority, educate your workforce, invest in measures that actually work, and hold everyone – including leadership – accountable to a high standard. In an era when violence can erupt at a school, a boardroom, or a campaign rally, preparation is not paranoia; it is a professional obligation and a moral one.

Ultimately, security is about protecting people, principles, and peace of mind. By closing the insight gap and eradicating complacency, we can prevent the next potential assassination or violent tragedy. It’s time to act decisively. In the words of a veteran protection executive, “We win 100% of the fights we avoid” – meaning the surest victory is to deter the fight from ever starting. Through diligent effort and the right partnerships, we can make our organizations and communities harder targets and ensure that would-be attackers are stopped before they pull the trigger. The cost of doing nothing – or doing the wrong things – is simply too high. Together, let’s build a culture of security excellence that meets this challenge head-on, and keeps our leaders, colleagues, and loved ones safe.

References

[1] DHS Independent Review Panel – Independent Review Panel Final Report on the July 13, 2024 Butler Rally

[2] U.S. House Task Force – Final Report of Findings and Recommendations: Investigation of the Second Assassination Attempt, West Palm Beach & Related Events

[3] U.S. Secret Service – Mission Assurance Inquiry Summary: Butler Rally – Operational Failures and Lessons Learned

[4] Volt.ai – Live Video Monitoring: Taking Security from Reactive to Proactive

[5] Resolute Partners – Why Security Video Surveillance Is Not Just About Cameras

[6] LVT Security – Security Camera Monitoring 101: Active vs. Passive

[7] ABC News – ‘Without reform’ to the Secret Service ‘another Butler can and will happen again,’ DHS independent review finds

[8] Senate Judiciary Committee (Grassley) – Report: Secret Service Failure to Share Threat Information in Butler Attempt